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Abstract: Commons and global public goods have become popular concepts 
in academic debates on governance. Moreover, these concepts are no longer the 
exclusive domain of economists. Different disciplines (such as legal and politi-
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cal theory) have appropriated them in their own specific ways. The result of this 
popularity, however, is that they are often confused or used in ways that muddle 
their distinct characteristics. In this article we propose some distinctions to clarify 
the use of these concepts. First, we will show how what were initially social scien-
tific concepts started being used in a more normative way. Second, we will subject 
the writings of Elinor Ostrom and Inge Kaul and colleagues to a discourse analy-
sis. This means that we will show that some normative assumptions are already 
present in the concepts of ‘commons’ and ‘global public goods’. We take it that, 
although Ostrom and Kaul are often read as social scientists, it is both possible 
and fruitful to read them as proposing two very different visions of power in a 
globalizing world. In a third section we then demonstrate more concretely what 
these visions look like. Finally, we conclude by looking at the possible advantages 
and downsides to both models.
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1. Introduction
Both the terms ‘commons’ and ‘global public goods’ (GPGs) are widely used 
in political discourses on how to tackle challenges such as climate change, food 
security, and transmission of knowledge. On the one hand, in academic writ-
ings and social movements, the commons have come to represent an ‘alterna-
tive model of social organisation’ going beyond the market-state dichotomy 
(Menatti 2017). The ground breaking work of Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated 
the capacity of communities to self-organize and share common-pool resources 
(CPRs), beyond the much travelled paths of the exclusively public or exclu-
sively private management solutions. Today, the commons do not only designate 
small-scale institutions for the management of shared resources at the local level, 
but also a wider range of struggles of self-government against the current wave 
of enclosures – from Occupy Wall Street to the Cochabamba Water War (De 
Angelis 2007; Hardt and Negri 2009; Harvey 2011). On the other hand, the series 
of three books edited by Inge Kaul and her colleagues of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) exemplify the popularity of expanding Paul 
Samuelson’s theory of public goods to the global level. The UNDP publications 
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brought to light that, in an increasingly interconnected world, the problems of 
security, financial stability, health and environmental protection inevitably affect 
every country, and therefore require collective action at the global level. In other 
words, both notions have become central to normative discourses in current 
political practice. However, as these notions became more prominent and were 
taken up by different disciplines, their definitions also began to vary and diverge. 
These two ‘buzzwords’ are now too often confused or even conflated, without 
acknowledging their divergent normative bias. Over the last years, the concepts 
seem to have lost practical meaning in framing discussions on exactly the same 
notions, for example of ‘knowledge’ (as a commons: Hess and Ostrom 2007; 
Frischmann et al. 2014; or as a GPG: Stiglitz 1999; Maskus and Reichman 2004) 
or ‘cultural heritage’ (as a commons: Gonzalez 2014; as a GPG: Francioni 2012). 
They are now sometimes even mentioned as synonyms, for example in the field 
of development (Severino 2001). The added value of this article is to confront 
both discourses in an attempt to bring some clarity in the distinction between 
commons and GPGs, and–more importantly–shed light on the diverging norma-
tive implications.
In terms of methodology, we argue that a useful way of doing this is by sub-
jecting the major works of Ostrom and Kaul and her colleagues to a discourse 
analysis. Hence, we do not assume that social scientists explain social phenomena 
and events in objective universal terms. Instead we try to uncover the norma-
tive assumptions that inform their writings and influence the way in which the 
objects of their research are constructed (Howarth 2000, 126–130). The rationale 
for using this method is that it allows us to become more sensitive to the politi-
cal choices that are often made invisible through the use of a scientific language. 
This is particularly important given the fact that scientific writings – and certainly 
social scientific analysis–help to frame the goals of social and political actors. For 
instance, social movements can pick up on scientific research to construct a new 
vantage point for their transformational efforts or to lend empirical credibility for 
their efforts (Benford and Snow 2000, 624–625).
However, we restrict our discourse analysis in two ways: we limit ourselves, 
first, to two sets of literature, and, second, we focus on their normative assump-
tions concerning power. We circumscribe our discourse analysis to the major writ-
ings of Elinor Ostrom on the commons, and of Inge Kaul and her colleagues 
on GPGs. The reasons why we restricted our analysis to these authors are both 
practical – to reach a manageable size–and substantive. Given the importance 
of Ostrom and Kaul’s work to these respective bodies of literature we consider 
that the normative assumptions implicit in their concepts have had a determining 
influence both on subsequent academic writings and political and social actors 
that make use of their works.
Besides, we limit our discourse analysis to the normative assumptions con-
cerning how power is conceptualised in each model of governance. Although 
Ostrom and Kaul are often read as social scientists, we argue that it is both 
possible and fruitful to read them as proposing two very different visions of 
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power in a globalizing world. By critically reviewing their works we see that 
they indeed formulate very different ideas on the nature of power and, in turn, 
this has specific consequences for their respective takes on the role of the state 
and the most appropriate spatial scale of governance. These three features 
are central in their analyses and are the most relevant in highlighting certain 
structural distinctions between both models of governance. Although we read-
ily admit that these elements do not constitute an exhaustive list, we believe 
that a discussion about how both discourses have tackled these three issues 
can already give valuable insight into their views on power. Although distinct, 
the three characteristics studied in this article are strongly interconnected, and 
each one of these may even be conditioned by the existence of the others. We 
cannot talk about the role of the state in global governance without dealing 
with the matter of the appropriate level of governance for global issues. These 
two, moreover, tend to be conditioned by a model’s preference for either top-
down or bottom-up decision making procedures, and for its understanding of 
the nature of authority.
This discourse analysis was executed as follows: first, we selected the most 
important and relevant texts from Ostrom (9) and Kaul (8) who were historically 
the most influential in disseminating the concepts of commons and GPGs in pol-
icy discourse and (still) play a central role in academic debates. We then identified 
the sections where these authors discussed the concepts of power, role of the state 
and the spatial scale of governance. Subsequently we interpreted these sections 
to show the hidden (normative) implications that the usage of the terms commons 
and GPGs may have and why it is important to draw a distinction between these 
two concepts in academic and policy discourses.
In view of these goals, the article is organised as follows. We first track the 
evolution of commons and GPGs from categories of goods in rational-choice 
theory to prescriptive models of governance (first section). In the following sec-
tions we will revisit some of the writings of Ostrom and Kaul through a dis-
course analysis. To be more precise, we present three defining characteristics 
of their discourse on commons and GPGs (see supra), in order to lay bare how 
they ‘frame’ the governance of certain policy-issues through particular norma-
tive prescriptions.
The conclusion of this paper reveals two radically different visions of the 
world: while the commons call for more bottom-up self-governance, GPGs seem 
to reinstitute the vertical logic of the state at the global level. On this account, we 
argue that the provision of GPGs, regardless of its effectiveness, generally suffers 
from a democratic deficit. Indeed, the institution of the commons itself depends 
on the prior agreement of all stakeholders to observe ad hoc rules of use and 
access which are seen as legitimate, whereas the provision of GPGs necessitates a 
coercive power to avoid collective action dilemmas (Deleixhe 2018). At the same 
time, we draw attention to strong forms of external and coercive power, namely 
state and market pressures, against which the commons will need to struggle in 
order to survive.
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2. Commons and global public goods as normative discourses
2.1. Rational choice theory
Many scholars, when using the concepts of commons and GPGs, trace their ori-
gins to rational choice theory, an oft-used framework for explaining social and 
economic behaviour. This traditional way of conceiving these concepts implies 
understanding them as ‘objective’ categories. This implies that there is something 
in the nature of public goods and common-pool resources (CPRs) which deter-
mines their place on the rivalry-excludability spectrum and sees a commons as the 
governance arrangement for these objectively identified CPRs. These objective 
categories can, with that premise, usefully be employed as analytical tools meant 
to describe the physical reality of certain goods, and in particular to explain some 
of the problems which goods classified as ‘common’ or ‘public’ would likely suf-
fer from. Authors such as Cornes and Sandler (1983, 1984, 1994), Rosen (2004), 
Dietz et al. (2003) have used these concepts to create models that can help explain 
provision and consumption issues in a wide range of non-excludable goods, such 
as defence, public finance and fish.
CPRs and public goods are expected to suffer from different types of collec-
tive action problems when individuals act in a self-interested and rational man-
ner. Given their rival and non-excludable properties, CPRs are expected to suffer 
from overexploitation. In order for a governance arrangement for a CPR to be 
considered successful, it should therefore stop the overuse of the resources it gov-
erns. Opinions differ as to whether this requires privatisation, intervention of an 
external authority or the setting up of an effective community-based institution (a 
‘commons’ – in this sense used to refer to a self-governing community rather than 
simply to a resource-area). Among social scientists who engaged in field stud-
ies of the commons, the most prominent scholar is undoubtedly Elinor Ostrom. 
Ostrom was an American political scientist associated with the neo-institutional 
school of thought in economics.1 Ostrom conducted field studies on how commu-
nities maintain long-term sustainable institutions (‘commons’) for the manage-
ment of CPRs such as forest, fisheries and irrigation systems. She devoted much 
of her life and research looking for the ‘recipe’ for a successful commons, culmi-
nating in eight design principles, whereby she identified clear group boundaries, 
rules and sanctions devised by and for members of that group (Ostrom 1990, 90). 
Success within a commons depends on the resilience of the system, or, in other 
words, on ‘the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganise while 
undergoing change, so as to retain essentially the same function, structure, iden-
tity and feedbacks’ (Walker et al. 2004). Such a system must be flexible enough to 
change when circumstances alter.
1 New institutionalism or neo-institutionalism is a methodological approach that became prominent 
in the 1980s in the fields of political science, economics and sociology. New institutionalism focuses 
on the way institutions (rules, norms and structures) affect the actions of individuals (see March and 
Olsen 1983).
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The main collective action problem connected with public goods is free-
riding. Because consumption is free, actors want to benefit from the collective 
resource but are reluctant to pay for its availability. Successful management of 
a public good is characterised, first, by a correct estimation of the demand for 
that good and, then, the production of the good at that level. It thus focuses on 
the production side and takes consumption as a given (Kaul et al. 1999c; Culp 
2016). Inge Kaul and her colleagues (Kaul et al. 1999c) have used public good 
theory to analyse global challenges, by identifying instances of underprovision 
of GPGs, such as global climate protection, epidemics control and knowledge. 
Kaul et al. define a GPG as benefiting all countries, people and generations. 
This already indicates that their definition has a strong normative, redistributive 
element. This is unusual, as economic theory generally does not concern itself 
with issues of redistribution (to whom the benefits accrue), but rather only with 
issues of  effective provision (how the benefits are generated). When an identified 
 problem is framed as the result of a lack in the production of GPGs, the conven-
tional response consists of states and international institutions working together 
in  estimating the demand and determining a division of production, focusing on 
one specific good.
Commons (in the sense of areas containing CPRs) would thus be in need 
of a different governance regime than GPGs. But framing problems as GPGs 
has occurred in many instances where a commons framework would have been 
equally appropriate (Bryner 2015, 41). As we will explain below, both commons 
and public good theory have integrated normative elements. We, therefore, argue 
that framing issues either in terms of commons or in terms of GPGs, should no 
longer be seen as based solely on traditional, objective criteria of excludability 
and rivalry, but that it has important normative components as well.
2.2. Normative discourses
A single property or area can produce several kinds of goods; a forest can produce 
wood for private contractors but also provide room for recreation. We must also 
consider that resources can be held under several types of governance structures: 
for example, the aforementioned forest could be privately or publicly owned 
(Acheson 2011) and by local or international institutions. Considering something 
as either a commons or a GPG entails more than a simple analytical exercise. 
Even though the results of overexploitation and underprovision are comparable 
in as far as they both lead to a lower than optimal presence of the good in ques-
tion, the perceived origin of the problem and the possible solutions are radically 
different. In this respect, the definition of a global issue as either a commons or 
a GPGs problem, determines to a great extent the institutional arrangements, and 
governance mechanisms applied to tackle it (Young 1989, 2007).
Whether a good is overexploited or underprovided is a seemingly objective 
question, but it requires in fact a normative judgement: does the food crisis in the 
Global South endure because of a lack of international aid, or are the farmlands 
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in developing countries overexploited or cultivated in the wrong way? Do we 
witness outbreaks of contagious diseases because of overpopulation or because of 
poor housing conditions? Is the climate changing because forests are destroyed or 
because our industries produce excessive amounts of CO
2
? Such framing shapes 
the interpretations of issues and events (Matthes 2012) and, thus, also the possible 
solutions for these problems.
Although both the commons and the GPG frameworks can still serve a useful 
descriptive and analytical function, they are also actively used to promote cer-
tain solutions for perceived problems in a normative sense. Unsurprisingly, these 
concepts have gradually come to be regarded as prescriptive, going beyond the 
description of what is or could be, to sketch what ought to be in the international 
arena. As Menatti (2017) notes, ‘commons have been often claimed as a new 
institutional and organisational framework–both local and global–in defining a 
non-capitalist society’. Commons have become a rallying call for a collection of 
social movements such as Occupy Wall Street, the Spanish Indignados (Mouffe 
2013) and the Rodotà Commission (Rodotà 2013). What these movements have 
in common is that they all argue for increased self-governance and participa-
tion by citizens (or ‘commoners’ as they are called in their lingo), and present 
themselves as an alternative to the traditional binary choice of state or market 
solutions.
Meanwhile in many international relations and organizations, such as the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO 2008), the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2002), the World Bank 
(Development Committee 2000), the Organization for Economic Coordination 
and Development (Reisen et al. 2004), the World Health Organization (Woodward 
et al. 2002), and the European Union (European Commission 2002) all branded 
the provision of GPGs as a new policy challenge of its own. This new challenge 
would require closer and more comprehensive international and perhaps even 
supranational cooperation, with increased abilities for international institutions to 
ensure that all relevant states and actors contribute.
3. Power
Now that it is clear that these concepts are being used in a more normative way, 
we will show what normative assumptions were already present in the original 
concepts. More precisely, we will argue that Ostrom and Kaul propose two differ-
ent models of power in a globalizing world. And if we want to come to grips with 
Ostrom and Kaul’s hidden assumptions concerning power, we would do well to 
start with their views on the nature of power.
What is immediately apparent is that the literatures on GPG and commons 
reveal very different conceptions of the nature of power. Inge Kaul thinks that 
Ostrom is insufficiently aware of the different forces that operate in the global 
sphere (Kaul et al. 2016). Consequently, proponents of GPGs criticise common-
ers for downplaying questions of force, coercion and violence. Defenders of the 
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commons often return the compliment, noting that proposals for organising the 
provision of GPGs rely on top-down enforcement, as opposed to bottom-up coop-
eration and communication (e.g. Quilligan 2012). Promoters of GPGs mistakenly 
assume that a degree of force, coercion and manipulation are a necessity, while 
in fact people are perfectly capable of working together and hence achieve better 
results that fit local circumstances (Ostrom 1992).
These stances neatly overlap with two influential positions on the nature of 
power in political theory. On the one hand, thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and Max 
Weber conceive of power as power-over. In the words of the latter: power is ‘the 
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry 
out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probabil-
ity rests’ (Weber 1978, 53). Consequently, violence, coercion and manipulation 
are treated as modalities of political and social action. Moreover, as states have a 
monopoly on violence and have most of the means to carry out their ‘will’, they 
can be seen as the embodiment of power-over.
On the other hand, there is the view, famously defended by Hannah Arendt, 
which involves an understanding of power as power-with. This form of power 
comes into being only when people act in concert and when they engage in uncon-
strained communication (Habermas 1977, 3). Here, power is not something that 
a certain actor ‘has’ and exercises over another, but exists ‘in between’ people. 
In other words, power is relational as opposed to unilateral (Penta 1996, 212). 
This entails that violence, coercion and manipulation appear as the opposite of 
power. As Arendt argues, ‘power cannot be stored up and kept in reserve for emer-
gencies, like the instrument of violence, but exists only in actualization’, that is, 
‘where word and deed have not parted company […] where words are not used to 
violate and destroy but to establish relations’ (Arendt 1970, 200). Political institu-
tions are only powerful as long as they rest on egalitarian and open communica-
tion among people.
If we look at the writings of Elinor Ostrom, it quickly becomes apparent that 
she adheres to the notion of ‘power-with’. Her research on CPRs, she argues, 
challenges ‘the Hobbesian conclusion that the constitution of order is only pos-
sible by creating sovereigns who then must govern by being above subjects, mon-
itoring them, and by imposing sanctions on all who would otherwise not comply’ 
(Ostrom et al. 1992, 414). In other words, people can cooperate and keep credible 
commitments without there being an external enforcer. However, there are some 
important conditions for a successful constitution of order: first, people have to be 
able to communicate and preferably do so regularly and face-to-face; second, peo-
ple should able to freely choose an ‘internal sword’–institutional stability thrives 
when participants are able to establish common norms and agree on sanctioning 
mechanisms, in order to punish those diverging from these norms (Idem, 414); 
and third, it is vital that ‘most of the individuals affected by a resource regime 
can participate in making and modifying rules’ (Ostrom 2000, 150). To condense 
the argument: in these arrangements power does not rest in an external institution 
or a centralised authority with the ability to impose and enforce rules of action 
Governing as commons or as global public goods: two tales of power 561
(Ostrom 2012), but exists in between people in a horizontal contract they con-
clude among themselves and keep alive through communication and their shared 
action.2
If we turn to Inge Kaul’s work on GPG, we find a different conception of 
power. Similar to Ostrom, she acknowledges the important task that institutions 
perform in the creation of order. However, the way Kaul conceives these institu-
tions is somewhat different. Institutions and regimes, she argues, can be consid-
ered as intermediate public goods, as they contribute towards the provision of 
final public goods. One indispensable task that they perform is that of monitoring 
and surveillance, since the main problem affecting the provision of public goods 
is that of free riding. This implies that in the absence of institutions directing or 
constraining these individuals (or, on the global level, states and corporate bod-
ies), it is impossible to ensure cooperation. In short, it seems that the steering 
role of the state, its ability to discipline free riders either through norm setting or 
through the exercise of coercive power, is of essential importance to the provision 
of public goods (Kaul et al. 1999b, 6–13).
However, on the global level, state failure is a given ‘due to the absence of 
a global sovereign’ (Idem, 15). Therefore, the nature of power changes as well. 
As Kaul writes, ‘conventional hard power may have to be combined with soft 
power to yield a ‘smart power’ strategy that enables states to achieve a suc-
cessful policy outcome’ (Kaul In Advance, 23). However, this does not neces-
sarily mean that Kaul veers toward the Ostrom position. First, the exercise of 
political pressure and coercion by states still has an important role to play in 
her scheme for the production of GPGs (Kaul 2013, 11). Second, power that 
is exercised non-violently and non-coercively can still constitute a form of 
‘power-over’. This happens when communication and participation are only 
admitted to the extent that they help actors achieve their goals. It persists where 
communication is not valued in itself, but only as a means for attaining a spe-
cific objective (Habermas 1977, 4). This is, in our view, the case in GPG dis-
course: communication and participation do play a role, to be sure, but only 
to the extent that they help in the attainment of a certain goal – namely, the 
provision of GPGs (Nordhaus 2005, 93). In this sense there is some truth to 
Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann’s claim that GPG discourse manifests a wish 
for a Climate Leviathan. This is ‘a regulatory authority armed with popular 
legitimacy, a panopticon-like capacity to monitor and discipline carbon pro-
duction, consumption, and exchange, and binding technical authority on scien-
tific issues’ (Wainwright and Mann 2012, 6).
2 Nonetheless, as one anonymous reviewer rightly noted, the notion of power-over is not completely 
eliminated in Ostrom’s writings. For instance, while Elinor and Vincent Ostrom advocated polycen-
trism, they acknowledged that polycentric systems allowed for the existence of monocentric ele-
ments within such systems (see for example: Aligica and Tarko 2012, 244). In other words, even a 
model built on the notion of power-with will have elements of power-over.
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4. The role of the state
From an institutional perspective, both commons and GPG theories reflect a deep 
frustration with the dominant state-centric system of governance. In both streams 
of literature, the opposition seems to be with the state understood in its more nar-
row organizational and bureaucratic sense. The state is seen as an obstacle. Both 
models indeed contrast with the Westphalian model, where the ultimate power 
(sovereignty) is situated in a state ideally organised in a hierarchical and central-
ised manner, and exercising control over most–if not all–policy areas in a territori-
ally defined jurisdiction. Both commons and GPG models recast this traditional 
(if not mythical3) idea of the Leviathan state as a basic regulatory power with the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force within well-defined territorial boundaries 
(Weber 1978, 56), albeit in very different ways. In this section, the ‘state’ repre-
sents the abstract notion of public authority that was and is still deemed necessary 
to coerce the behaviour of rational individuals and solve classic social dilemmas–
be it of overexploitation of CPRs or underprovision of GPGs. It is as a reaction to 
this traditional and hegemonic model of governance that the commons and GPGs 
have re-appeared as counter-narratives.
On the one hand, commons scholars (Ostrom et al. 1992; Ostrom 2009; 
Weston and Bollier 2013) challenge the centrality of the state because they reject 
the pessimistic idea that communities are incapable of managing shared resources 
collectively, without control and supervision by public institutions. Since Garett 
Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin 1968), it was indeed assumed that 
CPRs would be completely depleted unless enclosed through private property, or, 
failing that, public regulation. Commons scholars and activists, in contrast, argue 
that there is a third solution, which is neither ‘all-private’, nor ‘all-public’: the 
self-instituting and self-controlling practice of communities themselves. Elinor 
Ostrom was one of the first authors to forcefully and successfully defend this argu-
ment in Governing the Commons (Ostrom 1990). Her acceptance speech for the 
award of the Nobel Prize (Ostrom 2009) neatly summarised her lifelong effort to 
unearth the regulating principles and the institutional architecture that accounted 
for the success of modes of decentralised and bottom-up governance, beyond the 
much travelled paths of the exclusively private or exclusively public management 
solutions. Her research looks into the previously underestimated achievements of 
regimes of self-organisation at all levels of governance (Dragos et al. 2009). Her 
central claim turned conventional wisdom upside down: commons can prove to 
be sustainable on the condition that its stakeholders adopt a polycentric and self-
regulated mode of governance. Seen in this light, commons have been burdened 
by some authors with the responsibility of carving out an autonomous social 
3 This view of the state as a monolithic reification of a definable entity (the state as a ‘thing’ and not 
a ‘process’) has been criticised. The state can also be understood in a more relational and complex 
sense, like in Gramsci’s idea of the integral state as the ensemble of political society and civil society 
(see D’Alisa and Kallis 2016; Jessop 2016).
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space independent from both the atomism of capitalist markets and the hierarchi-
cal structure of the state (Bollier and Helfrich 2012). Commons represent in that 
sense a new ‘third way’ beyond the dominant market-state dilemma.
However, this is not to say that commons scholars aim to completely eschew 
the state or constitute a substitute for the state. While there are diverging ideas and 
political perspectives in the debate about the role of the state in the governance of 
commons, the consensus is that most commons will need to be formally recog-
nised as autonomous institutions by public authorities in order to survive. In her 
book, Governing the Commons, Ostrom puts forward as a seventh design principle 
that ‘[t]he rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions [should] not be 
challenged by external governmental authorities’ (Ostrom 1990, 101). Indeed, ‘if 
external governmental officials presume that only they have the authority to set the 
rules, then it will be very difficult for local appropriators to sustain a rule-governed 
CPR over the long run’ (Ostrom 1990). As Jane Mansbridge showed, this is not an 
‘anti-state message’ (Mansbridge 2014, 8). Although Ostrom clearly stands against 
a state-centric tradition, external government authorities can in fact be  instrumental 
in ‘nesting’ local commons within higher levels of decision-making. This is in line 
with Ostrom’s concept of polycentrism (as opposed to ‘monocentrism’) where each 
centre of decision making–at the local, regional, state and global levels–is formally 
independent of each other but enters into cooperative undertakings (see below). 
Commons activists today also recognise that the regulatory state continues to be 
‘the dominant governance system’ (Bollier and Helfrich 2012, 101). Since com-
mons are very often contested entities and sites of social struggle against the risks 
of bureaucratic centralisation and private enclosure, the legal or formal recognition 
and protection by public authorities of the community’s autonomy to develop self-
governing arrangements appears in many cases as a necessary condition for their 
sustainability. Even more than that, some commons scholars like Michel Bauwens 
have introduced the concept of ‘Partner State Approach’ (PSA), in which public 
authorities can acquire an active and positive role, not only in stopping enclosures, 
but as ‘partner’ in enabling autonomous social production by supporting the initia-
tives of commoners (Bauwens and Kostakis 2014).
On the other hand, the idea of public goods was originally developed in the 
field of Keynesian economics to provide legitimacy to a greater involvement of 
the state (Samuelson 1954). In the project defended by Inge Kaul and her col-
leagues at UNDP, ‘[n]ation states form important core elements of the interna-
tional community’ (Kaul 1999b, 15). Even if they concede that states alone are 
no longer sufficient to deliver public goods that transcend national boundaries, 
they argue that these remain the dominant actors. Indeed, state intervention is 
still considered as indispensable in the financing and provision of public goods 
at the national level. However, supranational and top-down mechanisms appear 
necessary to coerce free-riding states into the provision of much needed GPGs. 
Specifically, GPG supporters point to the absence of a ‘global sovereign’ or a 
state-like entity capable of enforcing contribution of GPGs by all states. That is 
the crux of the matter. This is why they call for more international cooperation 
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between states, for example through international organisations such as the UN. 
They also warn that the principles of state sovereignty and state consent represent 
obstacles for the effective provision of GPGs–the ‘basic problem [that] underlies 
all others’ (Zedillo and Thiam 2006, 3). Much like the individuals in the prison-
ers’ dilemma, it is expected that sovereign states acting in total independence 
will defect from cooperation, unless coercive mechanisms are introduced (Kaul 
1999b, 8). What this analogy highlights, is that, in order to coerce free-rider states, 
we need to transpose certain domestic strategies to the global level (Constantin 
2002, 81). For some legal scholars, for example, it seems the solution is to impose 
inter-state cooperation by ‘design[ing] punishments that are sufficient to induce 
compliance’ (Trachtman 2012, 161). What is striking in comparison to the bottom-
up commons framework, is that GPGs call for closing the jurisdictional gap at the 
global level with more inter-state cooperation from the top. As Martin Deleixhe 
concludes, the organization mode of GPGs ‘is closer to an inchoate world-state 
than to a polycentric federalism’ (Deleixhe 2018).
5. The scale of governance
Both models thus present a framework in which the role of the state is much 
reduced and different. They suggest governance should take place differently and 
at different levels, but provide different answers to questions of what these levels 
should be and what the appropriate ‘scale’ of these alternative governance systems 
should be. ‘Scale’ has generally been used in an analytical sense (Gibson et al. 
2000, 218).4 However, scale can also be used in a more normative sense, refer-
ring to two elements: (a) the question of the most appropriate level(s) (or spatial 
construction more generally) for governing certain goods or issues;5 and (b) the 
hierarchy among the different levels in decision-making. It is the responses of the 
commons and GPG governance models to these questions that we study here. As 
critical geography has demonstrated, the answers to such questions are ‘socially 
constructed’ and ‘dynamically active’, rather than objectively determined and fixed 
(Rudestam et al. 2015).6 We limit ourselves to the ideal spatial construction and 
relation among levels of governance set out by these models, excluding a discus-
sion of, for example, their conceptions regarding the appropriate temporal scale.7
4 These authors define ‘scale’ as ‘[t]he spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions used 
to measure and study any phenomenon.’
5 Gibson, Ostrom and Ahn define ‘levels’ as ‘[t]he units of analysis that are located at the same posi-
tion on a scale.’ They add that ‘[m]any conceptual scales contain levels that are ordered hierarchi-
cally, but not all levels are linked to one another in a hierarchical system.’ (Gibson et al. 2000, 218)
6 It has been suggested that commons scholarship and discourses have insufficiently taken the nor-
mative (including the political, social, economic and cultural) dimension of spatiality in the com-
mons into account (Moss 2014).
7 Note, however, that Kaul et al. explicitly adopt a definition of ‘global’ which includes a sociologi-
cal and temporal dimension, in that the goods in question should benefit or affect actors across social 
strata and across generations (Kaul et al. 1999b).
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5.1. Appropriate level of governance
Commons theory has its roots in the study of local communities collectively man-
aging a CPR, such as a pasture or an irrigation system. These roots have two 
important implications in determining the most appropriate level for governance. 
Firstly, since its origins the theory has established a close link between the gover-
nance system and the resource system it is called to govern. Giordano aptly states 
that ‘[a]t its most fundamental level, the problem of the commons revolves around 
humans, their environment, and the spatial relations between the two’ (Giordano 
2003, 365). Therefore, as resources are increasingly viewed as part of larger eco-
systems, commons theory has increasingly reflected the need for multi-layered, 
cross-scale governance systems. Secondly, commons theory has attached much 
importance to trust and reputation, as variables altering the traditional economic 
models which suggested cooperation between self-interested, rational individu-
als was impossible (Ostrom 1998). However, commons theory admits that trust 
and reputation largely depend on face-to-face communication (Dietz et al. 2003, 
1908). This requirement of face-to-face communication, in turn, relates closely 
to the need for a community to support the collective governance of certain 
resources, and the need for a practice of ‘commoning’ to support such communi-
ties. The central role of these elements (trust, reputation, face-to-face communi-
cation and a practice of ‘commoning’) suggests that commons-based institutions 
often function better when the spatial scale and the number of actors remains 
relatively limited (Araral 2014), as anonymity of the group members compli-
cates the effective functioning of a commons. Although governance at a lower 
level seems more appropriate for commons-based governance, this implies by 
no means that commons-based governance would be completely impossible at a 
higher level or with greater numbers of actors (Keohane and Ostrom 1994). New 
forms of commons, many of a digital nature, have demonstrated the potential suc-
cess of this governance model with larger groups and more anonymity (Benkler 
and Nissenbaum 2006). Think, for example, of different large scale volunteer- or 
peer-production projects such as Wikipedia. Nevertheless, it remains true that, in 
such cases, more effort will have to be expended to ensure trust, reputation and a 
practice of commoning can play their appropriate role.
Public goods theory, in contrast, has traditionally been focused on a higher 
spatial level, namely the state level. This theory has been developed to determine 
which goods should be provided by a central authority, the state. The GPG dis-
course upped the scale even more by highlighting global issues which accordingly 
require global solutions. In other words, public goods theory is much more ame-
nable to larger groups, with higher degrees of anonymity, as it generally does not 
rely on face-to-face communication for its effectiveness. In contrast with com-
mons, the governance model based on GPG accords less importance to trust and 
reputation, but rests on other normative principles, such as the rule of law and 
formal equality to ensure cooperation. These principles are better adapted to deal 
with situations of relative anonymity. Indeed, it is generally accepted that small 
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groups are able to effectively provide collective goods for their group members 
without some central, state-like authority intervening (Olson 1977). State inter-
vention, and qualifying something as a (global) public good, appears to be neces-
sary only where groups become too large to effectively self-organise. Moreover, in 
contrast with commons theory, public goods theory is less attached to resource(s) 
(systems). Whereas commons theories adopt an ecocentric approach (with the 
governance system following the resource system), GPGs tend to have a more 
traditional anthropocentric approach. The political community, rather than eco-
systemic elements, will form the basis for determining the appropriate levels of 
governance.
Contemporary approaches to governance have required both theories to 
change and adapt, albeit in different ways. Firstly, both normative frameworks 
explicitly recognise the complexity of the (spatial) scale issue, stressing the need 
for multi-level and, to a certain extent, trans-scalar models of governance (see, 
for example, Berkes 2007). In commons theory, this recognition has largely been 
translated into a focus on polycentricity, which refers to a model with horizontally 
and vertically dispersed centres of authority (Ostrom 2012). Vincent Ostrom has 
defined as the existence of ‘many centers of decision-making which are formally 
independent of each other’ (Ostrom et al. 1961, 831). In their seminal 1999 publi-
cation on GPGs, Kaul and her co-authors propose the development of a national-
global policy loop, which would strengthen the bonds and improve coordination 
between national and global policy-making (Kaul et al. 1999a). In other words, 
both frameworks are essentially embedded in contemporary research literature, 
which increasingly acknowledges that governance solutions must mirror the com-
plexity and cross-scale interlinkages of the resource systems and activities they 
govern (Buizer et al. 2011). Despite this similarity, the concepts have markedly 
different approaches to spatial scale especially with regard to the relationship 
between governance and resources, and the ideal size of groups.
Secondly, despite their traditional application to the local or state level, propo-
nents of both theories have argued that, today, many essential resources and issues 
are global in nature and that governance models should be adapted accordingly 
(McGinnis and Ostrom 1996; Kaul et al. 1999c; Ostrom et al. 1999). However, 
both theories have struggled to scale-up their governance models to the global 
level (Kaul 2012; Cumbers 2015). Even David Harvey, who considers himself 
a proponent of commons-based governance, admits that commons theories suf-
fer from ‘an analytically difficult “scale problem” […] that needs (but does not 
receive) careful evaluation’, in particular because ‘[t]he only politically correct 
form of organization in many radical circles is non-state, non-hierarchical, and 
horizontal’ (Harvey 2012, 69).
Although both theories are quite similar in this regard, they have adopted 
different strategies to overcome the challenges related to the global nature of the 
resource or activities to be governed, despite the fact that both consider subsid-
iarity an important ordering principle (Kaul et al. 1999c, 477; Marshall 2007; 
Fennell 2011, 20). GPG theory focuses mainly on the national and higher levels, 
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by placing states and international institutions front and centre. As Kaul and her 
co-authors argue: ‘If the problem is international in scope, decision making to 
address it will have to be done at that level’ (Kaul et al. 1999c, 466). Moreover, 
despite the insistence on the importance of a policy loop between the national 
and the global level and the importance of subsidiarity, the approach is rather 
hierarchical in nature, which is especially apparent in this theory’s questioning of 
the consensual nature of the Westphalian international system (Nordhaus 2005; 
Bodansky 2012). Commons scholarship, in contrast, generally emphasises the 
potential contributions of lower levels of governance and puts forward non-hier-
archical solutions. Ostrom, for example, has written that ‘relying entirely on inter-
national efforts to solve global climate problems needs to be rethought’ (Ostrom 
2012, 356). As mentioned, commoners will thus generally advocate a polycentric 
approach, whereby each governance institution maintains its autonomy with par-
ticular attention for self-organized communities, which are often more local in 
nature.
5.2. Hierarchy in decision-making
Even if there is a general consensus that different levels need to co-exist and 
cooperate in the governance model for both commons and GPG, the way that 
they understand the most appropriate decision-making process for this plurality 
of voices differs. Both commons and GPG discourses concede to the need to plu-
ralise the actors involved in governance, thus, pluralising the bearers of decision-
making power (by ‘nesting’ the governance of global issues, or by taking into 
account the trans-national and regional voices who may be affected by gover-
nance decisions taken locally) (Harvey 2011, 102). However, they differ greatly 
in their understanding of the appropriate relation among these various levels, with 
regard to who directs the decision-making procedures, and who bears the primary 
source of authority and power over their governance. The models of governance 
endorsed through the commons and GPGs discourses have structured themselves 
on an underlying opposition between a top-down and a bottom-up understand-
ing of how goods and practices ought to be produced, protected and promoted 
(Sabatier 1986; Deleixhe 2018). GPG theory, such as that endorsed by Kaul et al. 
tend to defend top-down governance, allocating the primary decision-making 
authority to higher levels (usually linked to international agreements and institu-
tions) due to their ability to produce more beneficial and efficient outcomes for a 
larger number of people, and to deal with collective action problems. Commons 
theory, on the other hand, inclines more towards a bottom-up hierarchy in deci-
sion-making power, claiming that allocating primary authority of governance to 
the communities that dwell within the spaces affected, can ensure a more sus-
tainable protection of goods and a more democratic approach to governing them 
through the active engagement of local populations in its management.
This distinction between bottom-up and top-down directives of governance 
can have important implications for the way we understand certain fundamental 
568 Nicolás Brando et al.
global issues. Forest governance is an interesting example due to its relevance to 
both commons and GPG discourses, and to the opposing normative intuitions each 
of them raise (Agrawal et al. 2008). From the GPG angle, the protection of forests 
from land-grabbing and deforestation is considered as a fundamental public good 
with global implications due to the environmental impact that deforestation may 
have on the global population (Kaul et al. 1999b, 24–25). It is in response to the 
high risk of global catastrophes that GPG discourses argue for the need to address 
them through global institutions. For commoners, on the other hand, protecting 
forests from depletion and privatisation is, first and foremost, harmful to the local 
communities who dwell there. Hence, the primary authority over how to ensure 
the sustainable development in forest regions should lie with those groups, who 
have greater knowledge of the issues at stake (Ostrom 1994, 10–11). Even though 
both discourses emphasise the need to protect forested regions from privatisa-
tion, deforestation, degradation and illegal logging (thus confronting monocentric 
state authority or privatisation), their conception of the primary decision-making 
power differs greatly, not only in terms of the intended governance practices, but 
also on the understanding of who are the stake-holders involved.
The commons model has tended to consider that local populations and their 
plural mechanisms for governing fundamental resources (such as forests) should 
be the prime decision-making authorities over these issues (Ostrom et al. 1999, 
281). In other words, governance should be bottom-up. Through an assessment of 
existing self-organised, long-enduring governance practices at the local level, it 
argues in favour of allowing local communities to take the lead in the protection 
and promotion of fundamental goods, as the most appropriate way of dealing with 
various global issues (Ostrom 1990, Ch. 3; Ostrom et al. 1999, 279). The case of 
forest governance offers a very clear example of the opposing governance claims 
made by GPG and commons discourses (Dupuits and Pflieger 2017). Following 
an understanding of forests as commons, the local organisation of communities 
who live and depend on forest regions are not only the primary stake-holders and 
those who have more to lose from bad governance of this resource, but also the 
most effective and efficient authorities for ensuring its protection (Ostrom 1994, 
20). Thus, governance should rely on a conic structure, which entrusts primary 
control and decision-making authority over resources to the communities who 
live and depend on them (Arnold 1998, Ch. 2). The local populations, as bearers 
of the primary authority over the governance of forests, are taken as active and 
direct participants in the protection and promotion of the goods in question.
On the other hand, the GPG discourse, as endorsed by Kaul and her co-authors, 
is, for the most part, a provision-oriented model. That is, its final objective is to 
ensure that a certain good–or protection from a certain ‘bad’–is provided to the 
global population (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999a, xxvi). The primary focus 
on the global population already determines the scale of stakeholders involved, 
thus pressing for a governance system that may best ensure provision to this wide 
public. The dual assumption of the selfishness of this plurality of actors and of 
the difficulty of achieving cooperative behaviour without strong and enforce-
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able governance mechanisms (especially if global collective action problems are 
involved) demands, according to the GPG model, a top-down approach to gover-
nance (Quilligan 2012). Taking the case of forests as an example once again, the 
primary objective is to ensure the GPG of environmental protection (or avoid-
ing the global public bad of greenhouse gases and global warming). Forests are, 
thus, intermediate goods of global interest due to their structural role in deterring 
global warming (Sandler 1997). Although, as an intermediate product, specific 
forests may be governed through different power regimes depending on particular 
circumstances; the overall governance of ‘forests’ (in a global sense) and their 
protection from deforestation, according to these discourses, should be a matter 
of primary authority of states and the global community as a whole (Kaul 2013, 
5). The local communities who dwell in these regions, and the governance mecha-
nisms they organise locally to protect their lands, are taken as intermediary agents 
whose power and decision-making authority over the spaces they inhabit depends 
on and is conditioned by the interests and outcome objectives that  transnational 
entities have predetermined (Sand 2004). This top-down approach inherent in 
GPG governance models has been a source of concern due to the fact that its focus 
on provision can make it blind to issues of democratic legitimacy (Krisch 2014; 
Cogolati et al. 2016, esp. 19–21).
GPG discourses have responded to these claims by appealing to the vari-
ous levels at which and directions in which governance of GPG ought to take 
place, and to the potential implementation of more democratic involvement of 
plural global voices in their governance system (Kaul et al. 1999c, 478–485; 
Schaffer 2012; Kaul 2013, 3). We submit, however, that even if these discourses 
defend the need to expand the democratic inclusion in the governance of GPG, 
this does not alter their top-down directive: defining what a GPG is, and how 
it should be governed in order to ensure effective provision, is determined by 
states and transnational authorities. It is mainly in the hand of a group of experts 
at the highest levels of governance who take the lead in defining both the objec-
tives and avenues to achieve them, making local populations mostly passive 
recipients of goods provided in a top-down fashion (Boonen and Brando 2016, 
141–147).
However, considering that there may be a democratic deficit in the governance 
model of GPGs does not imply that the commons discourse does not suffer from 
a similar ailment. The fact that commons theory implies a bottom-up directive in 
decision-making power should not lead us to conclude that the decision-making 
processes within commons is necessarily democratic. Communities have their 
own internal hierarchies, power-struggles and exclusion, and, despite the basic 
normative commitment of the commons discourse of empowering local com-
munities and promoting self-governance, the particular processes and practices 
within each community determine its democratic credentials.8
8 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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6. Concluding remarks
Our comparison of the GPG and commons discourses has foregrounded differ-
ences rather than similarities. Both discourses seem to recognise similar challenges 
(e.g. a growing number of issues which are global in nature), but the solutions to 
these challenges are radically different. The GPG discourse is concerned with 
effectively tackling issues of a global nature, through more inter-state cooperation 
and international institutions. Commons discourses, in contrast, reflect the ideal 
of self-governance of social movements and communities wary of market logic 
and state hierarchy. We summarise our main findings in the Table 1 below.
We submit that the comparison between both discourses allows us to reflect 
more thoroughly upon the merits of the governance models they present. Indeed, 
the comparison has given us some insight into the strengths and weaknesses of 
each with the concept of power playing an important thread to link the tensions 
and conflicts between the two models. Two important and related points of con-
tention arise: the discourses’ democratic credentials and the role they assign to 
self-governance.
The GPG discourse emphasises the economic goals of effectiveness and effi-
ciency. Indeed, it seems to be largely driven by experts embedded in international 
institutions. Although democratic amendments to its mainly output-driven ratio-
nal have been proposed, these seem to come more as an afterthought, once it has 
already been decided which goods count as GPGs and who should provide them. 
These decisions are largely taken by a limited group of influential institutions, 
with participatory mechanisms providing social legitimacy. This democratic defi-
cit becomes particularly apparent when compared to the active participation of 
communities in building up commons. The lack of awareness of GPGs discourses 
with democratic accountability in the past, and the strong concerns raised by crit-
Table 1: Comparative analysis of the normative implications of commons and GPGs.
 Commons  GPG
Power  Power-with
Power as cooperation
No unilateral coercion, violence, or 
manipulation
 Power-over
Power as the ability to steer the 
conduct of others




 Emergence and governance of commons 
independent from the hierarchical 
structure of the state, but ideally not 
challenged by the state
 Provision through supranational 
and top-down mechanisms capable 
of coercing free-riding states
Spatial scale  Polycentric
Eco-centric
Small to moderate-sized groups




National and larger-sized groups
Primary role for international/
global level
Top-down
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ics of GPGs in this respect (Krisch 2014), have led to recent work on the GPGs 
to tackle this issue more directly (i.e. Brousseau et al. 2012). GPGs scholars have 
introduced many insights (directly or indirectly) from the commons discourse 
in order to compensate for the discourse’s hierarchical rationale. For example, 
recent scholarly work has claimed the need to expand the scope of knowledge 
communities who should be involved at the stage of definition of what is a GPG, 
or the need to engage in a more profound process of collective learning between 
large-scale actors and local communities in order to ensure democratic legitimacy 
in the production and provision of GPGs (Brousseau and Dedeurwaerdere 2012).
Our comparison highlighted, as well, the central role that self-governance 
plays in commons discourses as opposed to the GPGs logic, which limits self-
governance to a great extent. As explained above, the commons discourse adopts 
a conception of power which can be described as power-with. It is held that power 
originates from the autonomous cooperation within (and among) communities. 
This conception of power is also evident in the rejection of most forms of hierar-
chy (although certain manifestations of it may still remain). Commons discourse 
is presented as an alternative to state authorities and market pressures, but one 
can question whether it has the capacity (and strategy) to deal with the external 
pressures that emerge from larger and more powerful entities. Local commons are 
extremely vulnerable social and ecological systems, and their sustainability can 
be questioned due to their (seeming) incapacity to counter external threats. Recent 
additions to the commons-literature are starting to address these issues. Hardt and 
Negri’s Assembly, to give an example, has addressed concerns with the instabil-
ity of commons systems, and provides a response to problems with hierarchy in 
organization (2017: 1–76) and the exercise of force in response to outside threats 
(2017: 269–274). The GPG discourse, on the other hand, suffers from the oppo-
site flaw. Namely, despite its attempt to pluralise the involvement of a diversity 
of actors in decision-making, its rationale relies on a classical statist logic of a 
monopoly on violence in order to ensure compliance and effective provision.
The particular way in which a good is framed determines to a great extent the 
normative possibilities in its management, production and provision. Commons 
and GPGs discourses, albeit their intention to address the same issues and ques-
tions of global governance management, lead to widely differing conceptions of 
what governance systems should do. We highlighted one important line of tension 
that stems from putting commons and GPGs discourses into discussion: namely, 
how power is understood, and how their differing notions of power determine to 
a great extent the scale and hierarchy in decision-making.
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